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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
5-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court correctly construe, interpret and apply the
Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Medved v. Glenn. 2004 WL1065503 (Utah
App.)?
This is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." Drake v. Industrial
Commission. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. Montova. 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994); Billings v.
Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996).

_!.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals in Medved v. Glenn, supra,

correctly interpret, construe and apply the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996)?
This is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." Drake, id.; Trujillo.
id., State, id.
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3.

In Utah may a plaintiff maintain an action for increased risk of

cancer recurrence when combined with a claim for actual present damages
resulting from substandard medical care?
This too is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." Sorensen v.
Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah App. 1994); Broad
Waterv. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 857, 834 N.3 (Utah 1993); Architectural
Commission v. Kabatznick. 949 P.2d 776, 777 (Utah App. 1997); Roarke v.
Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995).

4.

Is an increased risk of recurrence of cancer actionable in Utah,

regardless of whether combined with a claim of actual, present damage
resulting from substandard medical care? If so, when does the statute of
limitations begin to run on such a claim?
This too is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness."
Orton v. Carton, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); Klinqer v. Kiqhtlv. 791
P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to
d
On June 18, 2002, Richard Irion, M.D. undertook to perform a vaginal
illi'v ' J i n * i Ih Nil /

ill in/1" yuMj (ihI II Ill,i»nilI liiMinm i,/ mime" Inn p o s t m e n o p a u s a l b l e e d i n g .

((

»

No ultrasound was performed prior to this surgery. (R.10). However, an ultrasound
performed approximately two years earlier revealed an apparent cyst and endometrial
thickening. (R.10). During the June 18, 2002 surgery, Dr. Irion came upon a large
tumor which he mistook for a yellow mass. In attempting to remove it, he ruptured the
tumor, spilling its contents into Mrs. Snow's peritoneal cavity
Di Irion failed to perform a wash of Mrs. Snow's peritoneal cavity to clean the
area in whicl i the iii|ilii!i'il hninir i onlenls h.ui spilled
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surgery, he informed Mr. and Mrs. Snow that the tumor was benign. (R.1
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pathology report that the tumor contained malignant cells. Although Dr. Irion knew the
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nature of the tumor nor of the dangers incident to the spread of its malignant cells in her

1

All references to the district court record shall be cited as "R. ." Plaintiffs
shall be referred to sometimes collectively as "Mrs. Snow" and sometimes as "the
Snows." Defendant shall be referred to as "Dr. Irion."
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body. (R.11). Due to the delay in the Snows' receiving word of the malignancy of the
tumor, Mrs. Snow did not begin chemotherapy until over 90 days after the surgery in
which the tumor was discovered. (R.11).
Following the cancer diagnosis, Mrs. Snow underwent extensive cancer
treatment, including radiation and chemotherapy. (R.11). The oncological therapy
has been accompanied by considerable trauma, illness and expense. Although the
therapy appears to have been successful, Mrs. Snow remains at heightened risk of the
cancer. (R.11).
The Snows' complaint alleges that their damages include the incurrence of
significant medical and medical-related expenses, a loss of income, an impairment of
earning capacity and a loss of consortium. The complaint also alleges a likelihood of
cancer recurrence in Mrs. Snow, resulting in additional damages and a shortened lifespan. (R.13-14).
Dr. Irion filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that because Mrs. Snow has not yet
suffered a recurrence of the cancer, she and her husband are unable, as a matter of
law, to establish a legally cognizable injury to satisfy their prima facie claims of medical
negligence against Dr. Irion. (R.28).
Based on its reading of the Court of Appeals' decision in Medved, the district
court concluded that:

-4-

the Snows cannot pursue their possible later-developing
damages, nor may they split their claims as they are seeking
to do. Accordingly, dismissal, without prejudice is
appropriate. Consequently, defendant's motion to dismiss is
granted.
(R.92).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
T I ni is C(i)i 11 t's Medved < J ec11. i »11 1111 •

111'. 1111i • •. ; i m i < I i;•» c 11 v i \ n i a I 11 ( ' 1 I I i 1II i i $

Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
Applying the Medved holding as interpreted by the district court to this case would
. Medved ch
have any fairness in this case, it would have to be applied in a way that expressly
allows the Snows to re-file at anytime up to 2 years after Mrs. Snow's death
ipjjardless

Il

liiHIiti tin rHixvi in i iiiiiii . .mil m 1 (ills I lei

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
H i i i 1 nil!11.In IK II ,, n i l ' s lensinn In fumf rlisnii 1 ^ \\ of |\ Irs Sin ^ » "<-, roiiipLnnt
without prejudice and all of its conclusions supporting that decision constitute
rulings of law. The proper standard of review of those issues is "correctness,"
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granting no deference to the district court's conclusions. See ISSUES
PRESENTED, supra, and cases cited therein (pp. 1-2 , supra); See also White v.
Deeselhurst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Utah 1994).

ARGUMENT
I.
MRS. SNOW'S COMPLAINT AMPLY ALLEGES
LEGALLY COGNIZABLE INJURIES SEPARATE
FROM HER CLAIM OF HEIGHTENED RISK OF
CANCER RECURRENCE.
Dr. Irion declared in writing to the district court that: "the sole question
before this Court is . . . whether plaintiffs' claim of increased risk is an actual
present injury sufficient to sustain their claims of injury against Dr. Irion." (R.30).
This is incorrect. The Snows' complaint alleges significant damages separate
and apart from Mrs. Snow's claim of increased risk for cancer recurrence. It
asserts, for example, that Dr. Irion's substandard medical care has already
caused them: (a) loss of income and an impairment of earning capacity (R.14);
(b) the incurrence of significant costs for medical care and related needs (R.14);
and (c) "pain, grief, mental anguish, depression, emotional distress and loss of
enjoyment of life" (R.13). Additional present damages not founded exclusively
-6-

upon Mrs. Snow's heightened risk of cancer recurrence are alleged in fflJ27-29 of
the Snows' Amended Complaint:
27.

Plaintiff Marion Snow has suffered a significant
permanent injury that has substantially changed her
lifestyle, including incapacitating her to perform the
types of activities and other functions which she
performed before she was injured as a result of
defendant's substandard medical care.

28.

The activities and functions plaintiff Marion Snow can no
longer perform or can no longer perform in the manner
she previously performed them include, but are not
limited to, household duties and spousal activities.

29.

Plaintiffs have suffered a profound diminution in their
quality of life. The injury to plaintiff Marion Snow
complained of herein has significantly impacted her
husband, plaintiff Roger Snow in varied and significant
ways. Plaintiff Roger Snow is entitled, therefore, to
recover loss of consortium damages as provided by
Utah law.

(R.14-15).
In our system of pleading, it is the prerogative of the plaintiff, not the
defendant, to declare what her claims and damages are. Here, the Snows claim
Dr. Irion's substandard care has already caused them significant harm apart from
Mrs. Snow's heightened risk of being further debilitated or killed by the cancer Dr.
Irion caused to be spread in her body. They should not be precluded from
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proving what they have pled.2

II.
THIS COURT'S MEDVED DECISION, AS APPLIED BY THE
DISTRICT COURT, MISCONSTRUES AND IS AT VARIANCE
WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
SEALE V. GOWANS .
In its memorandum decision herein, the district court quoted from this
Court's Medved opinion and then stated: "Based upon the foregoing, it is clear
that under the current state of the law, the Snows cannot pursue their possible
later-developing damages. . . . "

(R. 92). This conclusion is simply erroneous.

In Seale. our Supreme Court acknowledged that when a person suffers
physical harm caused by another's negligence, she is entitled to recover

2

ln support of his motion to dismiss before the district court, Dr. Irion
declared "the gravamen of plaintiffs claim . . . is that Dr. Irion failed to properly
diagnose and advise Mrs. Snow of her cancer, and to refer her to an oncologist."
(R.29). Dr. Irion's written argument to the district court then undertakes to instruct
that court that "Dr. Irion did not cause Mrs. Snow's cancer." (R.30). Those
assertions were both gratuitous and at variance with assertions plainly set forth in
the Snows' operative pleading. The Snows' Complaint asserts that although Dr.
Irion did not cause Mrs. Snow's tumor, he did cause the spread of its malignant
cells throughout her body when he ruptured it, spilled its malignant cells into her
peritoneal cavity and failed to perform an immediate wash of the area. (See ffij
10 and 11 of Amended Complaint; (R.10-11).
-8-

damages not only for the harm already suffered, but also for that which will
probably result in the future:
General tort law recognizes that when a person has
suffered physical harm caused by the negligence of
another, "he is entitled to recover damages not only for
harm already suffered, but also for the which will
probably result in the future." Restatement (Second), of
Torts §912 cmt. e (1979): Jackson v.Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.. 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir. 1986). Indeed,
most courts follow the general rule that once some injury
become actionable, a plaintiff must plead all damages,
both present and future, and cannot thereafter bring
another action once future harm occurs. Gideon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.. 761 F.2d 1120, 1136-37
(&h Cir. 1985)....
(923P.2dat1364).
The district court apparently accepted Dr. Irion's contention that this Court's
recent decision in Medved v. Glenn. 2004 WL 1065503 (Utah App.) holds that a
plaintiff may not maintain an action to recover damages when part of the claim is
an enhanced risk of cancer recurrence. To the extent this Court's Medved
decision so holds, it is in error and inconsistent with the actual holding of the Utah
Supreme Court in Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
The distinguishing fact in Seale v. Gowans was the apparent absence of an
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allegation of present damage apart from a fear of cancer recurrence.3 The simple
holding in Seale was that "damages in the form of an enhanced risk only are not
sufficient to start the running the statute of limitations." (Id. at 1365). The
Supreme Court considered several cases from other jurisdictions and found them
distinguishable because in them "the plaintiffs had suffered actual damages in
conjunction with the increased risk of the cancer's recurrence." (Id. at 1365). Our
Supreme Court did not declare in Seale that a plaintiff may not recover damages
for enhanced risk of cancer recurrence. It merely declared that if one has no
damages until the recurrence of cancer, the statute does not begin to run against
that claimant until the cancer recurs. There is nothing in Seale suggesting a
claimant who has sustained an actual injury may not simultaneously pursue a
claim for enhanced risk of future harm. On the contrary, our Supreme Court
noted:
[Cjurrent recovery for future harm is "based upon the
probability that harm of one sort or another will ensue
and upon its probable seriousness if it should ensue."
3

In the Medved case, the record shows (at R.179 -180 therein) that Mrs.
Seale's complaint in Seale v. Gowans sought damages for injuries likely to occur
in the future. Her cancer did recur after she filed her complaint. Our Supreme
Court in Seale actually found that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on
Ms. Seale because of the defendant's failure to prove "that in 1988 Ms. Seale
could complain of any actual or present damages." Seale. id. at 1364-65.
-10-

Restatement (Second) of Torts $912. cmt. e (1979).
Many courts, following the Restatement approach, have
adopted a "reasonable certain" standard, requiring that
the plaintiffs prove that it is more likely than not that the
projected consequence will occur. See Wilson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp.. 684 F.2d 111,119 (DC Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1365.
Our Court then went on to note unfairness would result if
Plaintiffs who are not exhibiting any actual physical
harm but are facing the running of the limitations period
[were] forced to bring an action for injuries that may or
may not occur in the future.
Id. at 1366. Our Court then noted in passing that "many of these plaintiffs will be
unable to produce the necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more
likely to occur than not." Id. at 1366. This passing comment should not be
interpreted as precedent for the proposition that a claim for enhanced risk of
cancer recurrence is not actionable in Utah. On the contrary, it merely suggests
that a claim for enhanced risk of cancer recurrence is sometimes difficult for
plaintiffs to prove.
Seale does appear to support the proposition that if a man had been
exposed to a toxic chemical which has been shown to cause cancer but has
suffered no ill effects from the exposure, he could not bring a cause of action for
enhanced risk of cancer. Under Seale. he would have to have actually
-11-

contracted cancer before the claim would arise. If, however, as a result of
exposure to the toxic chemical, the man became ill, lost work and/or required
significant medical treatment and expenditure, then he could seek his actual
damages for his current illness and also seek damages for his enhanced risk of
cancer if he could prove it was "more likely than not" to manifest itself.
Nothing in our Supreme Court's opinion in Seale v. Gowans. supra, is
inconsistent with preexisting law that if one pleads an actual, present injury, one
may also plead future damages that are reasonably probable to occur. In Seale,
our Court expressly stated "once some harm is manifest, the limitations period
begins to run on all claims, present and future." Id. at 923 P.2d at 1364. There,
unlike here, Ms. Seale claimed no injury until cancer recurred in her hip. Our
Court found that the last event necessary to complete the cause of action was the
recurrence of cancer and, therefore, it was that event that initiated the running of
the statute of limitations.
Utah's legislature has included in our Health Care Malpractice Act a fouryear statute of repose, along with a two-year statute of limitations. In Utah, no
cause of action for medical malpractice can be entertained more than 4 years
after the date of the alleged malpractice. UCA §78-14-4(1). If a woman who has
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had to endure extensive cancer treatment for the spread of a malignancy which
could have been prevented by appropriate medical treatment has to wait until she
suffers recurrence of cancer before she may file suit, the recurrence may recur
more than 4 years after the original negligence. She would be prevented from
bringing an action. That would be a travesty of justice. Under that circumstance,
her claim would be time-barred and she would be afforded no relief whatsoever.
An "enhanced risk" of future harm may be considered "speculative" in the
absence of actual present harm or injury, but that does not render a claim for
future damages arising out of such enhanced risk inactionable when there has
been actual injury. Our Supreme Court has never declared that a person with a
present harm may not also claim a future harm.
In Utah, juries are instructed all the time that they may assess future
damages. See, e.g.. MUJI Instruction 27.2. 27.3 and 27.5

4

The chance of recurrence is a question of probability. A jury is provided
statistical information from which it may make an informed decision. Jurors
routinely are asked to decide whether an automobile collision victim's orthopedic
injury will result in arthritis in the future. They frequently make decisions based

4

These instructions are attached as Exhibit "5."
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on competent medical testimony and generally accepted statistical probability.
Though cancer is far more serious than arthritis, juries are competent to assess
the probability of future harm in such cases just as they do in orthopedic injury
cases.
In short, the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v. Gowans was
misunderstood and misapplied by this Court in Medved and by the district court in
this case.

III.
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE WOULD HAVE BEEN
FAIR IN THIS ACTION ONLY IF ACCOMPANIED BY AN
EXPRESS JUDICIAL DECLARATION THAT THE SNOWS
MAY REFILE THEIR ACTION AT ANY TIME, WHETHER OR
NOT CANCER RECURS, WITHOUT BEING AT RISK FOR
HAVING THEIR CLAIM DECLARED TIME-BARRED.
A claim for actual, already sustained damages resulting from the
negligence of another may not be rendered inactionable by its joinder with a claim
for enhanced risk of sustaining future damages. Even //under Medved a claim
for heightened risk of cancer recurrence were no longer ever actionable in Utah,
a plaintiff still has a right to pursue a claim for present damages independent of
the heightened risk of cancer recurrence. To hold otherwise would be contrary to
-14-

our rules of pleadings.
It is within the province of a plaintiff to declare what her claim is. Neither
the district court nor this Court has the right to preclude Mrs. Snow from pursuing
an action to recover damages for present and past injury merely because she
also seeks damages for a heightened risk of future injury.
In fl10 of the Medved decision, this Court declares:
Seale preserves plaintiff's claim for actual damages
until speculative damages become actual damages.
(2004 WL 1065503 at p.4, fl10). Unless this assertion is given full, liberal
interpretation, the rest of the Medved decision could work a terrible injustice.
Assume, for example, this Court dismissed the pending court case without
prejudice. Assume further that five years go by without a manifestation of any
further cancer symptoms in Mrs. Snow. Assume that the Snows, believing the
chances of further cancer troubles have diminished, decide then to proceed with
their claim for the damages they have already sustained as a result of Dr. Irion's
negligence. Will the new complaint they file at that time be actionable? Without
this court expressly declaring now that the statute of limitations is indefinitely
suspended, any dismissal without prejudice will be potentially illusory. A truly
non prejudicial dismissal requires a concomitant express suspension of both the
-15-

two year statute of limitations and the four year statute of repose5 pertaining to
the Snows' claims6.

IV.
THE FAIREST COURSE WOULD BE TO REVERSE THE
DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF DISMISSAL AND TO
ALLOW THE SNOWS TO PURSUE THEIR CLAIM AT A
SPEED APPROPRIATE TO MRS. SNOW'S CONDITION.
If this Court were to affirm dismissal of the Snows' complaint without
prejudice and the Snows were to thereafter file a new action seeking all of their
damages except those directly relating to the heightened risk of cancer
recurrence, dismissal of the new action would likely be sought on the ground that
the limitations period had run. As of now, over two years have elapsed since Mr.
and Mrs. Snow discovered Dr. Irion's negligence and harm flowing from it.

5

UCA §78-14-4(1)

6

The Medved decision highlights but only partially addresses the
troublesome problem facing claimants who have sustained both actual and
"speculative" damages in a case involving risk of cancer recurrence. Medved
seems to suggest a plaintiff having both actual and "speculative" damages may
safely hold her claim for actual damages in abeyance without fear of the statute
of limitations running against her until the feared cancer recurs. If the feared
cancer does not recur, however, it is not clear whether her present claim for
actual damages will be barred if she holds off filing it longer than two years.
-16-

Bringing a new action for past harm might well be viewed as violating the statute
of limitations.
I

h

circumstances would clearly be unfair. So too is it unfair to tell the Snows, in
effect: "even though you have already sustained harm, you may not maintain a
cl
harm based on your fear of the cancer reappearing. Instead, you must wait until
that fear is realized."
dismissal nt Mi

It would be far fairer to reverse the district court's

' >imw ', rl.iim , mil li i illnv the Snows

action at a speed appropriate to Mrs. Snow's condition, even if that means the
case moves slower than suggested by the Rule 26 guidelines.
i may argue the pendency of an unresolved action againsl
causes him harm. This may be true but such harm, if any, is small7 in
comparison

harm and prejudice the Snows will experience if they are not

7

Until this case is resolved, no money judgment will be entered against Dr.
Irion. Dr. Irion will not sustain any greater "injury" than what he has already
sustained by having been named as a defendant in a medical malpractice action.
The costs and fees he may incur will increase only if and when the Snows move
forward with their claim. Whatever delay occurs may actually benefit rather than
harm Dr. Irion. As long as nothing happens in the case, Dr. Irion is free from a
"bad" result.
-17-

allowed to pursue any claim. Neither the judicial system nor the district court's
individual docket will be appreciably harmed by allowing the Snows to move their
claim forward against Dr. Irion at a speed appropriate to her condition. The
circumstances of this case justify an exception to the normal scheduling routine
contemplated by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUEST
Mrs. Snow's complaint amply alleges present, legally cognizable injuries
and harm separate from and in addition to her claim for future harm based upon
her heightened risk for cancer recurrence. The allegations of her complaint
render inappropriate as a matter of law the district court's dismissal of her entire
suit.
This Court's Medved decision, as applied by the district court, misconstrues
and is at variance with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v. Gowans.
Applying the alleged Medved holding to this case would work an unconscionable,
unsupportable injustice.
Dismissal without prejudice could be fair in this action only if accompanied
by an express judicial declaration that the Snows may refile their action at any
-18-

time, regardless of whether cancer recurs, without being at risk for having their
claim declared time-barred.
This (,,(iuiI',IiiniliI reverse IIii1 ill I I H I I M I I I I , deusion ii'iirl.iti tin 'iiinvr.
complaint and allow them to pursue their claim for both present harms and future
harms. The Snows should be allowed the opportunity to prove in this present
action that they will I

>

recur in Mrs. Snow as a result of Dr. Irion's negligence.
Respectfully submitted this g* I

day of March, 2005.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Elliott J. Williams
Carol Stevens Jensen
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

f)

Pldg Appeals Brief.0317

-20-

ADDENDUM EXHIBITS
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District Court's September i /, 2004 Memorandum Decision.

2.

District Court's September 27, 2004 formal Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice.

3.

Utah Supreme
(Utah 1996).

4.

Court of Appeals Decision in Medved v. Glenn, 2004 WL 1065503.

5.

MUJI 27.2, 27.3 and 27.5.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARION SNOW a n d ROGER SNOW,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiffs,
C a s e No.
Honorable

vs.

040908601
GLENN K.

Court Clerk:

RICHARD A IRION, M.D.,

IWASAKI

J j ^ g g gRffflCT COURT
Third Judicial District

, , — S E P 17 2004
Defendant

— ^ P ^ W T L A K E CQUN/Y
Deputy Clerk

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Court heard oral argument

with respect to the motion on September 13, 2004.
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.

Following the
The Court having

considered the motion and memoranda and for the good cause shown,
hereby enters the following ruling.
On June 18, 2002, defendant Richard A. Irion, M.D.,
performed a vaginal hysterectomy on Mrs. Snow, for postmenopausal bleeding.

During the surgery, Dr. Irion observed and

removed a mass on Mrs. Snow's ovary.

With this Complaint,

plaintiffs allege that in attempting to remove the mass, Dr.
Irion ruptured the tumor, spilling its contents into Mrs. Snow's
body.

It is plaintiffs' position the presence of the tumor

should have been discovered in advance, which would have

Page 2
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permitted excision of the tumor abdominally and avoided the
injury which occurred in this case.

Plaintiffs are alleging

present damages as well as damages based upon Mrs. Snow's
heightened risk of cancer recurrence.
With this motion, defendant asserts that because Mrs. Snow
has not suffered a recurrence of the cancer, plaintiffs are
unable, as a matter of law, to establish a legally cognizable
injury to satisfy their prima facie claims of medical negligence
against Dr. Irion.

See Medved

v. Glenn

(Utah Ct. App. 2004; see also Seale

v.

et

al.,

Gowans,

2004 WL 1065503
823 P.2d 1361

(Utah 1996).
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing they have amply alleged
legally cognizable injuries separate and apart from, and in
addition to, Mrs. Snow's heightened risk for cancer, and even if
under Medved

the claim for heightened risk for cancer is nor

actionable, plaintiffs still have a right ro pursue a claim for
present damages, independently.

Moreover, it is plaintiffs'

position dismissal without prejudice could be fair only if
accompanied by an express judicial declaration that plaintiffs
may re-file their action at any time, whether or not the cancer
recurs, without being at risk for having their claim declared
time-barred.

Finally, it is plaintiffs' position the most

reasonable course would be to deny the motion to dismiss and
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allow them to pursue their claim at a speed appropriate to Mrs.
Snow's condition.
Referring to Sealef

the Medved

court stated the following:

The supreme court held that the statute of
limitation did not begin to run on the
plaintiff's claim until she discovered the
recurrence of cancer because, under Utah law,
claims cannot be split by plaintiffs. See
[Seale
923 P.2d at 1364] (noting
parenthetically that "[o]nce injury results,
there is but a single tort and not a series
of separate torts. . .. [A] plaintiff may not
split a cause of action by seeking damages
for some of his injuries in one suit and for
later-developing injuries in another (first
and third alterations in original)(citation
omitted). Accordingly, the statute of
limitations begins to run on all present and
future claims once harm is discovered. See
id.
In Seale,
the claimed harm was the
recurrence of the cancer, and since i"c did
not manifest itself until three years after
the plaintiff's radical mastectomy, the
statute of limitation began running when the
plaintiff discovered the recurrence. See id.
at 1365-66. To hold otherwise would allow
statutes of limitation to run on negligence
claims that had yet to occur. See id. at
1364.
Based upon the forgoing, it is clear that under the current
sate of the law, the Snows cannot pursue their possible laterdeveloping damages, nor may they split their claims as they are
seeking to do.
appropriate.
granted.

Accordingly, dismissal, without prejudice is

Consequently, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is

SNOW v. IRION

DATED this
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day of September, 2004

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040908601 by the method and on the date
specified.
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.
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V '. day of

NAME
CAROLYN STEVENS JENSEN
ATTORNEY DEF
257 EAST 2 00 SOUTH
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
CAROLYN STEVENS JENSEN (6338)
WILLIAMS & H U N T
Attorneys for Defendant, Richard A. Irion, M.D.
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Phone (801) 521-5678
Facsimile (801) 364.4500

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

2 7 2004

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARION SNOW and ROGER SNOW
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

v.

RICHARD A. IRION, M.D.

Civil No: 040908601
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Glenn K.
Iwasaki on September 13, 2004 at the hour of

) a.m. on Dr. Irion's Motion to

Dismiss without Prejudice. Douglas G. Mortensen, of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen &
Jeppson, appeared on behalf of plaintiffs Marion and Roger Snow, and Carolyn Stevens
Jensen, of Williams & Hunt, appeared on behalf of defendant Dr. Richard A. Irion.

The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and having considered the
pleadings, memoranda, affidavits and exhibits that have been filed by the parties, and being
fully advised, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
Granted, and the above-captioned action and the plaintiffs Complaint, be and the same are
hereby dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Bichard A. Irion, M.D., the parties to
bear their own respective costs and attorney fees.
DATED this

Day of.

., 2004.

BY THE COURT

Glenn K. Iwasaki
District Court Judge
APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

DOUGLAS G. MQRTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

2

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATF
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

NIKKI BOWEN, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant, Richard A. Irion, M.D., herein; that she
served the attached Order Granting Defendant's Motioi 1 to Dismiss witl lout Prejud ice in
Case No. 040908601 before the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Douglas G. Mortensen
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, PC.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the

day of

September, 2004.

Nikki Bowen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this £p"l\Vday of September, 2004.

NOTARY PUBLIC
I
DANETTEA. LYON
|
257 East 200 South Ste 500
l031 6
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Cite ss 923
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2. Limitation of Actions <3>95(12)
John SEALE, personal representative
of the Estate of Beverley Seale,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Donald F. GOWANS, M.D., and Holy Cro s s
Hospital, dba Holy Cross Breast Center,
and Holy Cross Breast Care Services,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 940599.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 2, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1996.

Patient brought medical malpractice action against physicians for alleged negligent
failure to diagnose her breast cancer. The
District Court, Salt Lake County, Richard ^J.
Moffat, J., denied patient's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, and entered
judgment for physicians on basis that action
was time barred. Patient appealed. T^e
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that physicians failed to establish that patient suffered
legal harm, as would begin running of tw0year medical malpractice limitations period,
on date that cancer spread from her breast
to her lymph nodes.
Reversed and remanded.

Two-year limitations period for bringing
medical malpractice action does not begin to
run until injured person knew or should have
known that he or she had sustained "injury
and that injury was caused by negligent action. U.CA1953, 78-144.
3. Limitation of Actions <2^55(3)
Physicians failed to establish that patient suffered legal harm, as would begin
running of two-year medical malpractice limitations period, on date that cancer spread
from her breast to her lymph nodes; only
evidence produced by physicians was ~ that
cancer's ^spread to lymph nodes increased
risk that cancer would recur. U.C.A.1953,
78-14-4.
4. Limitation of Actions <£=>55(1)
Once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all tort claims,
present and future.
5. Negligence <3=*1
Until there is actual loss or damage
resulting to interests of another, claim for
negligence is not actionable.
6. Negligence c=>103
Without proof of actual damages, alleged
claim for enhanced risk is not adequate to
sustain cause of action for negligence.

Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in result
Fred R. Silvester, Clark A. McClellan, Salt
Lake City, for the Seaies.
1. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1), 1024.4
When party challenges trial court's denial of judgment notwithstanding verdict
(JNOV) on ground that evidence presented } s
insufficient to support jury verdict, state Supreme Court reverses only if, viewing evidence in light most favorable to prevailing
party, Court concludes that evidence is insufficient to support verdict. Rules CivJProc.,
Rule 59.

J. Anthony Eyre, Kirk Gibbs, Salt Lake
City, for Dr. Gowans.
David W. Slagle, Terence L. Rooney, Brian
P. Miller, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiff Beverley Seale appeals the trial
court's denial of her motion for a judgment
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notwithstanding the verdict.1 The trial
court, upon findings made by a jury, held
that the statute of limitations barred Ms.
Seale from bringing a medical malpractice
claim against defendants Donald F. Gowans,
M.D., and Holy Cross Hospital, dba Holy
Cross Breast Center and Holy Cross Breast
Care Services, for Dr. Gowans* allegedly negligent failure to diagnose her breast cancer.
Ms. Seale now contends that there was insufficient evidence to uphold the verdict. We
agree.
This case arose from Dr. Gowans* alleged
failure to detect a mass in Ms. Sealed mammogram taken in August 1987 at Holy Cross
Hospital. This mass was not discovered until
May 1988, when Ms. Seale had another mammogram taken at the same hospital. Ms.
Seale was then referred to Dr. Hugh Hogle,
who performed a needle biopsy. The biopsy
revealed that the mass was cancerous.
When Dr. Hogle disclosed the results of the
biopsy to Ms. Seale, he also showed her the
mammogram taken in 1987 and pointed out
to her that it contained the same, although
smaller, mass found in the 1988 mammogram.
Within a few days, Ms. Seale underwent a
radical mastectomy. Pathological studies of
the removed area revealed that a second
malignant tumor had formed and that the
cancer had spread to eight of her twenty
lymph nodes. Although all known cancerous
areas had been removed, Dr. Hogle told Ms.
Seale that the finding of cancer in her lymph
nodes signified a statistically increased probability that cancer would recur in other parts
of her body. Ms. Seale subsequently under1. Ms. Seale, who originally appealed, is now
deceased. John Seale, her personal representative, has been substituted as plaintiff.
I. Ms. Seale actually commenced this action a
few days before doctors informed her that the
cancer had spread to her hip. Defendants tfms
argue that Ms. Seale knew of her injury before
the recurrence of the cancer in 1991. We find
no merit to this contention. As discussed hereafter, if Ms. Seale's cancer had not recurred, she
could not have recovered for an enhanced risk of
the cancer's recurrence.

went radiation treatment and hormone therapy to enhance the likelihood of complete recovery. She continued to receive treatment
and to have periodic monitoring for recurrence of the cancer. Up until August 1991,
all subsequent tests remained negative.
In the summer of 1991, Ms. Seale began
experiencing discomfort in her left hip. After receiving unsuccessful treatment for the
pain, Ms. Seale had a bone scan in August
1991 which revealed cancer in her left hip.
That same month, Ms. Seale commenced this
action2 against Dr. Gowans and Holy Cross
Hospital for their allegedly negligent delay in
diagnosing her cancer, which allowed the
cancer to spread to her hip.3
Defendants affirmatively pleaded that the
two-year limitations period in section 78-14-4
of the Utah Code barred Ms. Seale's action.
They argued that the limitations period began to run in 1988 when Ms. Seale learned of
her breast cancer and was shown her 1987
mammogram, which contained the suspicious
mass Dr. Gowans failed to detect.
The trial court initially denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment, holding that
a factual issue existed as to whether Ms.
Seale knew or had reason to know of her
legal injury in 1988. Upon motion to bifurcate the trial, the statute of limitations issue
was tried separately before a jury, which
returned a special verdict in favor of defendants finding that Ms. Seale "discovered, or
through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered," her injury in June
1988, when she was correctly diagnosed.
Ms. Seale subsequently filed a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict
3.

Both parties use the terms "metastasis" and
"metastasized" to denote the spread of die cancer. Defendants construe diese terms to mean
any spread of the cancer, including die spread to
the adjacent lymph nodes. Plaintiff argues that
metastasis is the spread to another part of the
body. We find diis definitional debate inconsequential. The true issue is whether the spread to
Ms. Seale's lymph nodes constitutes a legally
cognizable injury. Thus, to avoid confusion, we
refer to the spread of Ms. Seale's cancer from
her breast to her hip as a "recurrence" of the
cancer.
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(j.n.o.v.), which the trial court denied. Ms.
Seale now appeals that denial, contending
that the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict. She argues that the evidence
does not show that she could have discovered
any injury from which she sustained damages until the cancer recurred in her hip.
Thus, she posits, the trial court erred in
refusing to grant her motion for a j.n.o.v.4

reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury
In Foil v. Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148
(Utah 1979), this court construed the term
''injury" in section 78-14-4 to mean "legal
injury." In other words, the two-year limitations period "does not commence to run until
the injured person knew or should have
known that he had sustained an injury and
that the injury was caused by negligent action." Id,; see also Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah
1989) ("Discovery of legal injury . . . encompasses both awareness of physical injury and
knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable to negligence.").5 In Foil, we
adopted the following reasoning from the
Oregon Supreme Court:

[1] Before reaching the merits, we set
forth the standard of review. A trial court
must enter a j.n.o.v. in circumstances where
"the facts or the law do not support the
verdict. Utah R.Civ.P. 59; see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799
(Utah 1991) ("In passing on a motion for a
j.n.o.v., . . a trial court has no latitude and
must be correct.")- When a party challenges
a trial court's denial of a j.n.o.v. on the
To say that a cause of action accrues to a
ground that the evidence presented is insuffiperson when she may maintain an action
cient to support a jury verdict, we "reverse
thereon and, at the same time, that it
only if, viewing the evidence in the light most
accrues before she had or can reasonably
favorable to the prevailing party, we conbe expected to have knowledge of any
clude that the evidence is insufficient to supwrong inflicted upon her is patently inconport the verdict." Heslop v. Bank of Utah,
sistent and unrealistic. She cannot main839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992); see also
tain an action before she knows she has
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799; Hansen v Stewone. To say to one who has been wronged,
art, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Thus Ms.
"You had a remedy, but before the wrong
Seale " 'must marshal all the evidence supwas ascertainable to you, the law stripped
porting the verdict' and then show that the
you of your remedy," makes a mockery of
evidence cannot support the verdict." Hanthe law.
sen, 761 P.2d at 17-18 (quoting Pnce-Orem
Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 601 P.2d at 148-^9 (quoting Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966)).
713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986)).
[2] The statute of limitations applicable
to malpractice actions against health care
providers, commonly referred to as the "discovery rule," is set forth in Utah Code Ann.
$ 78-14-4, which provides in part:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of
4- ~Ms Seale also argues that the trial court erred
111
refusing to present her proposed instruction to
the jury However, because we find that the trial
judge erred in finding that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, we do not
reach this argument

[3] As with any affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every
element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars Ms. Seale's claim.
Utah R.Civ.P. 9(h) ("[T]he party pleading the
statute must establish, on the trial, the facts
showing that the cause of action is so
barred."); see also Stewart v. K& S Co., 591
P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Slayden v. Sixta,
250 Kan. 23, 825 P.2d 119, 122 (1992). De5. The court correctly instructed the jury that
"[k]nowledge of a 'Legal Injury' is defined as the
date upon which the injured person knows or
should know that she has sustained an injury and
that the injury was caused by negligence "
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fendants contend that the evidence produced
at trial shows that in May 1988, Ms. Seale
had discovered or should have discovered
both Dr. Gowans' negligence in failing to
detect her cancer and the injury that resulted from that negligence. They assert that
the injury triggering the running of the statute was the cancer's spread to Ms. Seale's
lymph nodes, which statistically increased
the chance that the cancer would recur and
thus decreased her chance of long-term survival.6
We agree that the evidence was sufficient
to show that in 1988, she knew or should
have known that Dr. Gowans had negligently
failed to diagnose her cancer. We also agree
that the evidence was sufficient to show that
in 1988, Ms. Seale knew of the cancer's
spread to her lymph nodes. However, defendants have failed to show that the cancer's
spread to her lymph nodes was a sufficient
legal injury to start the running of the limitations period.
[4,5] General tort law recognizes that
when a person has suffered physical harm
caused by the negligence of another, "he is
entitled to recover damages not only for
harm already suffered, but also for that
which will probably result m the future."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 cmt. e
(1979); Jackson v Johns-Manville Sales
Corp, 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.1986). Indeed, most courts follow the general rule that
once some injury becomes actionable, a plaintiff must plead all damages, both present and
future, and cannot thereafter bring another
action once future harm occurs. Gideon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 761 F.2d 1129,
1136-37 (5th Cir.1985) ("[0]nce injury results
6. Dr Hogle testified
[W]omen who have small tumors with no positive nodes have long-term survival in excess of
85 percent, 90 percent When the lymph
nodes are involved, it drops significantly, to
slightiy under 50 percent, and the more lymph
nodes that are involved the higher the probabilities are that we're dealing with systemic
disease
In the arena of asbestos exposure, a few courts
have construed the "single cause of action" rule
so as not to preclude a later suit for latent

there is but a single tort and not a series of
separate torts, one for each resultant
harm . . . [A] plaintiff may not split this"
cause of action by seeking damages for some
of his injuries in one suit and for laterdeveloping injuries in another.");7 see also~~
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 2426 (1982). Accordingly, once some harm is
manifest, the limitations period begins to run
on all claims, present and future. See Sevy
v. Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah
1995) ("The general rule regarding statutes
of limitations is that the limitation period
begins to run- when the last event necessary
to complete the cause of action occurs.").
However, the law does not recognize an inchoate wrong, and therefore, until there is
" 'actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another/ " a claim for negligence is
not actionable. Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1136
(quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 30,
at 165 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Hunsaker v
State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993) (actual
damages along with breach of duty must be
pleaded to sustain cause of action for negligence). As a result, even though there exists
a possibility, even a probability, of future
harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, and
a plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests itself. Keeton, supra, at 165. Until a
plaintiff suffers actual harm or damages, the
limitations period will not accrue.
[6] Applying these principles to the instant case, we find that defendants failed to
prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally cognizable injury when she discovered that the
cancer had spread to her lymph nodes. The
only evidence that defendants produced regarding the harmful consequence of the candisease even though earlier injuries were incurred Eg, Wilson v Johns-Manville Sales
Corp, 684 F 2 d 111, 112 (D C Cir 1982) (allowing suit for mesothelioma even though deceased
had earlier discovered he had asbestosis without
bringing suit for that disease) Because defendants have failed to show mat Ms Seale discovered any damages resulting from the spread to
her lymph nodes m 1988, we need not address
whether we would similarly construe the single
cause of action rule for failure to diagnose cases
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cer's spread was that it increased the r&k
that the cancer would recur. They failed £°
argue or produce evidence that in 1988, M2Seale could complain of any actual preset
damages. Although we agree that the carreer's spread resulted in a dramatic decrea£e
in Ms. Seale's chance of survival, we concluo*e
that without proof of actual damages, a n
alleged claim for enhanced risk is not ad£~
quate to sustain a cause of action for negli"
gence. See Steingart v. Oliver, 198 Cal*
App.3d 406, 243 CaLRptr. 678, 681 (198$
(holding that breach of professional duty
causing only nominal damages, speculative
harm, or threat of future harm does ntft
suffice to create cause of action for negll"*
gence).8 As a result, defendants have faile^
to meet their burden of showing that M£Seale discovered any legally cognizable inji>~

the cancer had spread to the patient's lymph
nodes. Id. at 1039. However, the patient
did not file suit for the negligent misdiagnosis until the cancer had recurred in another
part of her body two years later. The court
held that under those circumstances, the
trigger date for the purposes of the statute
of limitations was when she "first learned
that the cancer had metastasized beyond the
surgically removed portions" to another part
of her body, not when the patient was correctly diagnosed. Id at 1040-41. The court
reasoned that when the patient first learned
of the misdiagnosis, there was no evidence
that the alleged negligence "had resulted in
any harm to her." Id. at 1040. The court
then noted that under the discovery rule, "it
is the knowledge of injury " which triggers
the statute, "not notice of probable or possi-

statutory time period when she brought he?
action in 1991 when the cancer appeared i*1
her hip.

Our holding that damages in the form of
an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to
start the running of the statute of limitations
r
not
only comports with generally accepted
Defendants' reliance on cases from othe
principles
of tort law, but also mmimizes the
jurisdictions is misplaced. See Colbert *0filing
of
speculative
suits, thus saving judicial
Georgetown Univ, 641 A2d 469, 47^
time
and
resources.
More importantly, any
(D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc) (negligent perfor*
alternative
ruling
might
effectively preclude
mance of lumpectomy instead of radical maS~
a
patient
from
any
recovery,
even when a
tectomy); Swain v. Curry, 595 So.2d 168,171
significant
harmful
effect,
such
as the recur(Dist.Ct.App.1992), review denied, 601 So.2^
rence
of
cancer,
later
occurs.
As
previously
551 (Fla.1992) (failure to detect breast cannoted,
current
recovery
for
future
harm is
cer). In these cases, the evidence showed
"based
upon
the
probability
that
harm
of one
that the plaintiffs had suffered actual dam'
sort
or
another
will
ensue
and
upon
its
probages in conjunction with the increased risk of
able
seriousness
if
it
should
ensue."
Rethe cancer's recurrence. Ms. Seale's case is
more similar to the circumstance addressed statement (Second) of Torts § 912 cmt. e
by the Florida Court of Appeals in Johnsoft (1979). Many courts, following the Restatey. Mullee, 385 So.2d 1038 (Dist.CtApp.1980)> ment approach, have adopted a "reasonably
review denied, 392 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1981). I£ certain" standard, requiring that the plainthat case, a doctor's misdiagnosis caused & tiffs prove that it is more likely than not that
patient's cancer to go undetected for si* the projected consequence will occur. See
months. Similar to Ms. Seale's circum- Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684
stance, pathological studies of the area re- F.2d 111, 119 (D.C.Cir.1982). Following this
moved from the patient also revealed that approach, if we were to adopt defendants'
°. This case is unlike the situation we addressed
in Hansen v Mountain Fuel Supply Co , 858 P 2&
970, 979-81 (Utah 1993) In that case, we ruled
°n the narrow issue of whether an individual
could recover for medical monitoring costs nc
cessitated by an increased risk of contracting
cancer due to an exposure to asbestos We did
Ut Rep 2d (922 928)—7

not reach the issue of whether the enhanced risk
alone was a sufficient injury to support a cause
of action Id at 973 n 2 In fact, we noted that
the plaintiffs could bring another action "if and
when they do develop a serious disease as a
result of their exposure." Id at 973.
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position, plaintiffs who are not exhibiting anyactual physical harm but are facing the running of the limitations period would be forced
to bring an action for injuries that may or
may not occur in the future. However, many
of these plaintiffs will be unable to produce
the necessary evidence to show that the future harm is more likely to occur than not.
Yet if the harm, such as the recurrence of
cancer, actually later occurs, the plaintiff
would be precluded from any recovery for
devastating injuries by reason of having acquired an earlier claim for purely speculative
ones. We believe that the better approach is
to wait until the potential harm manifests
itself, allowing for more certain proof and
fewer speculative lawsuits.
Because the only evidence defendants presented at trial, and the only evidence Ms.
Seale could marshal, showed that Ms. Seale
could not have discovered any legally cognizable injury until 1991, we find that the
evidence was insufficient for a jury to find
that Ms. Seale discovered her injury in 1988.
As a result, the trial court erred in denying
Ms. Seale's motion for a j.n.o.v. We reverse
and remand the case to allow John Seale, as
Ms. Seale's personal representative, to argue
her case on its merits.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE, J., and GUY
R. BURNINGHAM, District Judge, concur
in Justice DURHAM'S opmion.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & Mc
DONOUGH, a Utah professional eorpo
ration, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross
Appellant,
v.
Jerilyn Shelton DAWSON, Defendant,
Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
No. 940595.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 6, 1996.

Law firm brought action against former
client to collect attorney fees incurred representing client in divorce action. The District
Court, Washington County, J. Philip Eves,
J., awarded firm attorney fees incurred in
divorce but denied request for attorney fees
incurred in collection action. Client appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that:
(1) collateral estoppel did not bar chent from
rehtigating reasonableness of attorney fees;
(2) attorney's oral statements capped fees to
which firm was entitled; and (3) firm was not
entitled to collect fee for pro se representation in collection action.
Affirmed as amended.

STEWART, Associate C J., concurs in the
result.
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Because a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law,
Court of Appeals reviews such dismissal for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's
decision. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 12(b)(6).
[2] Pretrial Procedure €=^622
307Ak622 Most Cited Cases

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jamie MEDVED, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
C. Joseph GLENN, M.D.; and Estate of Blayne L.
Hirsche, M.D., Defendants and
Appellees.
No. 20030338-CA.
May 13, 2004.
Background: Patient brought medical malpractice
action against gynecologist and surgeon, alleging
that defendants failed to timely diagnose breast
cancer. Defendants filed motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The Fourth District, Provo Department,
Lynn W Davis, J., granted motion and dismissed
action without prejudice. Patient appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held
that:
(1) claim for damages concerning increased risk of
recurrence of cancer was not actionable, and thus
prohibition on splitting actual and speculative
claims arising from a single tort warranted dismissal
without prejudice, and
(2) claim for actual damages would be preserved,
for limitations purposes, until speculative damages
became actual damages.
Affirmed.
[1] Appeal and Error €^=>863
30k863 Most Cited Cases

[2] Pretrial Procedure €^>680
307Ak680 Most Cited Cases
Purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted is to
challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for
relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits
of a case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(b)(6).
[3] Action €=>53(2)
13k53(2) Most Cited Cases
Patient's claim for damages concerning increased
nsk of recurrence of cancer was not actionable m
medical
malpractice
action
alleging
that
gynecologist and surgeon failed to earlier diagnose
patient's breast cancer, and thus prohibition on
splitting actual and speculative claims arising from
a single tort warranted dismissal of action without
prejudice; claim was speculative in that patient had
not suffered recurrence of cancer and recurrence
was not a foregone conclusion.
[3] Health €=>673
198Hk673 Most Cited Cases
[3] Health € ^ 6 8 4
198Hk684 Most Cited Cases
Patient's claim for damages concerning increased
risk of recurrence of cancer was not actionable in
medical
malpractice
action
alleging
that
gynecologist and surgeon failed to earlier diagnose
patient's breast cancer, and thus prohibition on
splitting actual and speculative claims arising from
a single tort warranted dismissal of action without
prejudice; claim was speculative m that patient had
not suffered recurrence of cancer and recurrence
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was not a foregone conclusion
[4] Damages €=>J41
115kl41 Most Cited Cases
Once some injury becomes actionable, a plaintiff
generally must plead all damages, both present and
future, and cannot thereafter bring another action
once future harm occurs
[4] Judgment € ^ 6 0 0 . 1
228k600 1 Most Cited Cases
Once some injury becomes actionable, a plaintiff
generally must plead all damages, both present and
future, and cannot thereafter bring another action
once future harm occurs
[5] Negligence € ^ 4 6 0
272k460 Most Cited Cases
The law does not recognize an inchoate wrong, and
therefore, until there is actual loss or damage
resulting to the interests of another, a claim for
negligence is not actionable
[6] Limitation of Actions € ^ 5 5 ( 3 )
241k55(3) Most Cited Cases
Patient's claim m medical malpractice action for
actual damages resulting from doctors' alleged
failure to timely diagnose breast cancer would be
preserved, for limitations purposes, until speculative
damages concerning increased risk of recurrence of
cancer became actual damages, actual and
speculative damages arising from a single tort could
not be split
Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable
Lynn W Davis
James W Gilson and Michael F Richman, Murray,
for Appellant
Curtis J Drake, Anne D Armstrong, and Dennis C
Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for Appellees
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and JACKSON
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DAVIS, Judge
*1 ^| 1 Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal
of her complaint, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure We affirm.
BACKGROUND
H 2 From 1991 through early 1998, Dr. Glenn
served as Plaintiffs obstetrician/gynecologist. In
late 1997, Dr Glenn diagnosed a lump on Plaintiffs
breast as fibrocystic breast disease. On July 13,
1998, Plaintiff saw Dr Hirsche [FN1] about a
breast augmentation One week later, Dr. Hirsche
ordered and performed a mammogram, which
revealed dense fibroglandular tissue bilaterally, no
significant abnormality, and no evidence of
malignancy The report from the mammogram
indicated that the breast was heterogeneously dense
and that this may lower the sensitivity of
mammography On August 12, 1998, Dr. Hirsche
performed a bilateral breast augmentation and a
needle aspiration of three suspected cysts on
Plaintiffs right breast After monitoring Plaintiffs
progress and the suspected cysts on her right breast,
Dr Hirsche performed an excisional biopsy of three
nght breast nodules on December 16, 1998. A
pathological examination of the excisional biopsy
revealed the presence of differentiated infiltrating
ductal carcmoma
To treat this particularly
malevolent form of breast cancer, Plaintiff
underwent a radical mastectomy of her right breast
on December 28, 1998, and followed that procedure
with chemotherapy, radiation therapy, and surgical
reconstruction of her breast To this date, Plaintiff
has not suffered a recurrence of cancer
TI 3 Plaintiff filed her complamt against Dr Glenn
and Dr Hirsche (collectively, Defendants) on
March 5, 2001, alleging that they acted negligently
and delayed the breast cancer diagnosis Plaintiff
further alleged that this delay caused her to undergo
more extensive treatment than necessary, and left
her with an increased risk of cancer recurrence
Defendants, relying upon rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, filed a joint motion for
dismissal without prejudice on August 2, 2002. The
trial court, stating that "Utah law has not recognized
claims of increased risk in the absence of a related
injury [and that] Plaintiff
has not claimed an
injury clearly related to
nsk[ of cancer
recurrence,]" granted Defendant's joint motion and
to Ong U S Govt Works
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dismissed Plaintiffs complaint without prejudice on
March 19, 2003 Plaintiff now appeals
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
D][2] 11 4 Although Plaintiff purports to raise
several issues on appeal, she essentially argues that
the trial court erred by dismissing without prejudice
her complaint for current, actual damages and
speculative damages Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Seale v
Gowans, 923 P 2d 1361 (Utah 1996), allows
individuals to bring claims for both actual damages
that have accrued and prospective damages that
may or may not occur "Because a rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is a conclusion of law, we review for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's
decision " Whipple v Ainencan Foik hligation Co ,
910 P2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) "[T]he purpose
of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish
the facts or resolve the merits of a case
[Dismissal is justified only when the allegations of
the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff
does not have a claim " Id "In determining whether
a trial court properly dismissed an action under rule
12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in
the complaint are true and we draw all reasonable
inferences m the light most favorable to the
plaintiff "Id at 1219
ANALYSIS
*2 [3][4][5] 1) 5 "[M]ost courts follow the general
rule that once some injury becomes actionable, a
plaintiff must plead all damages, both present and
future, and cannot thereafter bring another action
once future harm occurs " Seale v Gowans, 923
P2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) (alteration m
original) "[T]he law does not recognize an inchoate
wrong, and therefore, until there is ' "actual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another," ' a
claim for negligence is not actionable " Id
(citations omitted) "As a result, even though there
exists a possibility, even a probability, of future
harm, it is not enough to sustain a claim, and a
plaintiff must wait until some harm manifests
itself "Id
U 6 In Seale the Utah Supreme Court decided
whether the statute of limitation for malpractice
actions against health care providers barred the
plaintiffs claim for negligent failure to diagnose her
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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breast cancer See id at 1362-66 Plaintiff claimed
that the defendants failed to detect a cancerous mass
in her breast during an earlier mammogram. See id
at 1362 A few months later, a second mammogram
showed a larger mass that was confirmed to be
cancerous See id The plaintiff underwent a radical
mastectomy, and although all known cancerous
areas were removed, her doctors found that the
cancer had spread to eight of her lymph nodes See
id This spread increased the likelihood of
recurrence of cancer See id Little more than three
years after her mastectomy, a bone scan revealed
that the cancer had recurred in her left hip See id
The statute of limitation issue was tried before a
jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding that the
plaintiff should have discovered her injury when she
was originally diagnosed with cancer, and therefore,
the statute of limitation had run on her claim See id
On appeal from the trial court's denial of the
plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial
court See id at 1363, 1366
H 7 The supreme court held that the statute of
limitation did not begin to run on the plaintiffs
claim until she discovered the recurrence of cancer
because, under Utah law, claims cannot be split by
plaintiffs See id at 1364 (noting parenthetically
that " '[o]nce injury results there is but a single tort
and not a senes of separate torts [A] plaintiff may
not split this cause of action by seeking damages for
some of his injuries m one suit and for
later-developing injuries m another' " (first and
third alterations m original) (citation omitted))
Accordingly, the statute of limitation begins to run
on all present and future claims once a harm is
discovered See id In Seale, the claimed harm was
the recurrence of the cancer, and since it did not
manifest itself until three years after the plaintiffs
radical mastectomy the statute of limitation began
running when the plaintiff discovered the
recurrence See id at 1365-66 To hold otherwise
would allow statutes of limitation to run on
negligence claims that had yet to occur See id at
1364 ("[T]he law does not recognize an inchoate
wrong, and therefore, until there is ' "actual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another," ' a
claim for negligence is not actionable " (citations
omitted))
*3 H 8 Plaintiff argues that Seale does not prevent
her from bringing a negligence action against
Orig U S Govt Works

Page 4

2004 WL 1065503
... P3d _
(Cite as: 2004 WL 1065503 (Utah App.))
Defendants for their failure to diagnose her breast
cancer earlier, nor does it prevent her from
recovering damages for her actual harm as well as
future damages if cancer recurs. Plaintiff points to
language from Seale for the proposition that she
may maintain a claim for the risk of cancer
recurrence if she also presently claims actual
damages. See id. at 1365 ("[W]e conclude that
without proof of actual damages, an alleged claim
for enhanced risk is not adequate to sustain a cause
of action for negligence.").
H 9 Plaintiffs reliance upon Seale for her position
is misplaced. Seale clearly stands for the
proposition that speculative claims are not allowed
under Utah law. See id. at 1366 ("We believe that
the better approach is to wait until the potential
harm manifests itself, allowing for more certain
proof and fewer speculative lawsuits.").
[6] U 10 Then, relying on our prohibition against
claim splitting, Plaintiff asserts that she should be
allowed to pursue her claim for speculative
damages so long as she simultaneously pursues her
claim for actual damages. Seale does not stand for
this proposition. Rather, Seale preserves Plaintiffs
claim for actual damages until speculative damages
become actual damages. See id. While it may be
true that Plaintiff has an increased risk of cancer,
whether the cancer will recur is purely speculative.
Since the radical mastectomy, chemotherapy,
radiation therapy, and reconstruction, Plaintiff has
not suffered a recurrence of cancer. While she is
faced with a higher risk of breast cancer, this
recurrence is not a foregone conclusion. As such,
Plaintiffs claim for the increased risk of recurrence
of cancer is "not actionable." [FN2] Id. at 1364.

Tj 12 Under Utah law, an action for negligence
cannot be pursued until a plaintiff suffers an injury.
The risk of the recurrence of cancer does not
constitute an injury. Because both actual and
speculative claims arising from a single tort cannot
be split, we conclude that the trial court correctly
dismissed Plaintiffs action without prejudice.
H 13 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Associate Presiding Judge and NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Judge.
FN1. Dr. Hirsche was killed in an airplane
accident in November 2002, and on
December 10, 2002, the estate of Dr.
Hirsche was substituted as a party
defendant.
FN2. Plaintiff also relies upon George v.
LDS Hospital 797 P.2d 1117 (Utah
Ct.App.1990). George is inapposite to this
case because (1) it was a wrongful death
case where actual damages had already
been sustained, and (2) the focus of the
decision was on causation, not speculative
damages. See id. at 1118-22.
2004 WL 1065503, 2004 WL 1065503 (Utah
App.), 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2004 UT App 161
END OF DOCUMENT

^] 11 We therefore conclude that the trial court
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs action without
prejudice. We do not reach the issue of whether
Plaintiff may amend her pleadings to pursue her
claim for actual damages, perhaps waiving her
claim to speculative damages to avoid the
proscription of Seale. Nor do we address the
consequences of such an action, including the
application of the statute of limitation to her claim
for actual damages, unconnected to a claim for
speculative damages.
CONCLUSION
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DAMAGES

27.2

MUJI 27.2
PERSONAL INJURY - GENERAL DAMAGES
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain,
discomfort, and suffering, both mental and physical, its probable
duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has
been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as
previously enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the
above will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so,
you may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate
the plaintiff for them.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by
law to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is
the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such
reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel
as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall
exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in light of the
evidence.
References:
Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980)
Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953)
BAJI No. 14.13 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission; copyright ®
1986 West Publishing Company
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27.3

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL

MUJI 27,3
PERSONAL INJURY - SPECIAL DAMAGES
EXPENSES INCURRED
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable
value of medical [hospital and nursing] care, services and supplies
reasonably required and actually given in the treatment of the
plaintiff [and the reasonable value of similar items that more
probably than not will be required and given in the future].
Comments
It may be necessary to spell out the collateral source rule in certain cases
If that is necessary, the following may be added "The fact, if it be a fact,
that any of the foregoing expenses were paid by some source other than the
plaintiff's own funds does not affect the plaintiff's right to recover for such
expenses "
References:
Judd v Rowley's Cherry Hdl Orchards, Inc , 611 P 2d 1216 (Utah 1980)
BAJI No 14 10 (Supp 1992) Reprinted with permission, copyright ©
1986 West Publishing Company
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27.5

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL

MUJI 27,5
PERSONAL INJURY - SPECIAL DAMAGES
LOSS OF FUTURE EARNING CAPACITY
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity,
you should award the present cash value of earning capacity
reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a result of the injury in
question.
References:
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 108 Utah 577, 162 P.2d 759 (1945)
BAJI No. 14.12 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission, copyright ©
1986 West Publishing Company
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